Long-lasting postdictive effects have recently been discovered in psychophysical experiments. These strong effects demonstrate that perception of a first stimulus can be altered by a second stimulus presented hundreds of milliseconds later. I will review experimental findings on long-lasting postdiction, with a focus on the Sequential Metacontrast Paradigm, and explore theoretical implications. First, I will present the debate between temporally continuous and discrete theories of consciousness, and argue that long-lasting postdiction supports a 2-stage view in which spatio-temporally precise unconscious processing precedes discrete and sparse conscious percepts. Second, I will address the debate between global and local theories of consciousness. Local theories state that one is conscious of a feature if it is adequately represented and processed in sensory brain areas. Globalists respond that merely representing a feature is not enough: consciousness involves the broader coordination of a variety of neuro-cognitive modules. I will argue that long-lasting postdiction contradicts the core claim of local theories by showing that features can be represented for hundreds of milliseconds in perceptual areas without being consciously perceived.